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I
INTRODUCTION
What does the law mean to the common person? Such a broad question
could be answered in more than one way, depending on one’s vantage point,
disciplinary background, and so forth. From an economic-analysis perspective,
an individual actor would consider the law as a system of incentives. In this
view, incentives provide—indeed, constitute—reasons for action. The focus thus
shifts from incentives in isolation to the mechanism that engenders such
incentive-sensitive behavior. In the traditional neoclassical economic account,
individuals respond to incentives with a motivation to maximize their expected
utility—also known as rational preferences. Economic analysis of law that
subscribes to the rationality assumption thus treats the law as a price system of
sorts.
That the traditional rationality assumption fails systematically in predicting
people’s behavior in important circumstances is not much in dispute anymore.
Research on bounded rationality in behavioral economics harnesses insights
primarily from cognitive psychology to suggest directions for developing an
organizing framework for non-standard preference formation. This research
addresses major aspects in which actual behavior diverges from the behavior
predicted by the traditional rationality-based model. However, because
economics still lacks a general theoretical account that could replace the
rational preference workhorse, legal applications of behavioral economics tend
to be more specific than general, at least at the level of generality reflected in
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the question that opens this article: What does the law mean to the common
person?
This article makes an admittedly bold attempt at outlining an analytical
framework for addressing this question. Instead of looking at the legal
implications of bounded rationality—an exercise highly worthy in its own
right—this article advances a theory of expanded rationality. This theory retains
the element of rationality in that people respond to incentives in an attempt to
attain utility, and it does not question the observation that decision-making is
often bounded due to various factors. The main thrust of the present theory is
to expand the concept of personal utility such that it comprises personal values.
This theory might be useful for economics in general, but it could be
particularly beneficial for elaborating law-and-economics accounts of legal
issues that have been restricted by the traditional model of rationality.
Defined as conceptions of the desirable, values guide the way individuals
select actions, evaluate people and events, and explain or justify their actions
and evaluations. Values thus operate as arguments in individuals’ personal
utility functions, underlie the construction of preferences, and provide reasons
for reason-based choice. The present theory expands the conception of
rationality by incorporating a set of motivational goals that is richer than the
standard depiction of self-interestedness, yet avoids tautology. This expanded,
values-based account of preferences and incentives lends itself to illuminating
fundamental questions about legal design and the role of law in society.
The remainder of this article describes the theoretical underpinnings of the
expanded rationality model and its application to the law. Part II provides a
brief introduction to the theory of values as it has developed in psychology. Part
III reviews two central strands in the economic literature on rationality and
demonstrates how the theory of values can serve to develop a general account
of expanded rationality. Part IV applies this theory to four fundamental legal
problems: (1) the link between values and the content of laws, (2) the role of
values in law abidingness, (3) the effect of value diversity in groups on legal
design, and (4) the crucial aspect of value conflict in the application of law.
II
VALUES: CONCEPTUALIZING THE DESIRABLE
A. The Nature of Values
For several decades, research in social psychology has developed and
refined theories on individual values. Although economists and law-andeconomics scholars cannot be accused of ignoring psychology, this branch of
psychological research has been virtually overlooked despite its considerable
potential; thus, this part presents with some detail the currently dominant
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theory.1 According to Shalom Schwartz, a consensus has emerged among social
scientists about how to conceptualize basic values. This conception includes six
features:
1. Values are beliefs that are linked inextricably to affect. When values are activated,
they become infused with feeling. People for whom independence is an important
value become aroused if their independence is threatened, despair when they are
helpless to protect it, and are happy when they can enjoy it.
2. Values refer to desirable goals that motivate action. People for whom social order,
justice, and helpfulness are important values are motivated to promote these goals.
3. Values transcend specific actions and situations. Obedience and honesty, for
example, are values that may be relevant at work or in school, in sports, business, and
politics, with family, friends, or strangers. This feature distinguishes values from
narrower concepts like norms and attitudes that usually refer to specific actions,
objects, or situations.
4. Values serve as standards or criteria. Values guide the selection or evaluation of
actions, policies, people, and events. People decide what is good or bad, justified or
illegitimate, worth doing or avoiding, by considering the effects on attaining their
cherished values.
5. Values are ordered by importance relative to one another. The ordered set of
values forms a system of value priorities. Societies and individuals can be
characterized by their systems of value priorities. Do people attribute more
importance to achievement or justice, to novelty or to tradition? This hierarchical
feature also distinguishes values from norms and attitudes.
6. The relative importance of multiple values guides action. Any attitude or behavior
typically has implications for more than one value. For example, attending church
might express and promote tradition, conformity, and security values for a person at
the expense of hedonism and stimulation values. The trade-off among relevant,
competing values is what guides attitudes and behaviors. Values contribute to action
to the extent that they are relevant in the context (hence likely to be activated) and
important to the actor.2

Schwartz has advanced a comprehensive theory of individual-level values
that represent universal requirements of human existence—namely, biological
needs, coordination of social interaction, and group functioning—as
motivational goals.3 Since its introduction, this has been the predominant theory
of individual values in psychology.4 Table 1 provides definitions of the ten
values distinguished by the theory and value items that reflect them.

1. The following draws liberally on Shalom H. Schwartz, Value Orientations: Measurement,
Antecedents and Consequences Across Nations, in MEASURING ATTITUDES CROSS-NATIONALLY:
LESSONS FROM THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL SURVEY 169 (Roger Jowell et al. eds., 2007).
2. Id. at 170–71 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
3. See Shalom H. Schwartz, Universals in the Content and Structure of Values: Theoretical Advances
and Empirical Tests in 20 Countries, in ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 1 (Mark
Zanna ed., 1992); Shalom H. Schwartz, Are There Universal Aspects in the Content and Structure of
Values?, J. SOC. ISSUES, Winter 1994, at 19.
4. See PETER B. SMITH, MICHAEL HARRIS BOND & CIGDEM KAGITCIBASI, UNDERSTANDING
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY ACROSS CULTURES ch. 2 (3d ed. 2006); Steven Hitlin & Jane A. Piliavin,
Values: Reviving a Dormant Concept, 30 ANN. REV. SOC. 359 (2004). For earlier theories, see Clyde
Kluckhohn, Values and Value-Orientations in the Theory of Action, in TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF
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Table 1: The Schwartz Individual Value Types and Values that Represent
Them
Self-Direction

Independent thought and action-choosing, creating, exploring (creativity,
freedom, independent, curious, choosing own goals)

Stimulation

Excitement, novelty and challenge in life (daring, a varied life, an exciting life)

Hedonism

Pleasure and sensuous gratification for oneself (pleasure, enjoying life)

Achievement

Personal success through demonstrating competence according to social
standards (successful, capable, ambitious, influential)

Power

Social status and prestige, control or dominance over people and resources (social
power, authority, wealth)

Security

Safety, harmony and stability of society, of relationships and of self (family
security, national security, social order, clean, reciprocation of favors)

Conformity

Restraint of actions, inclinations and impulses likely to upset or harm others and
violate social expectations or norms (self-discipline, obedient, politeness,
honoring parents and elders)

Tradition

Respect, commitment and acceptance of the customs and ideas that traditional
culture or religion provide (accepting my portion in life, humble, devout, respect
for tradition, moderate)

Benevolence

Preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people with whom one is in
frequent personal contact (helpful, honest, forgiving, loyal, responsible)

Universalism

Understanding, appreciation, tolerance and protection for the welfare of all
people and for nature (broadminded, wisdom, social justice, equality, a world at
peace, a world of beauty, unity with nature, protecting the environment)

Schwartz’s theory further specifies the structural interrelations among
values. These values can be drawn as segments of a circle. Figure 1 depicts this
spatial arrangement. Adjacent values are conceptually close to one another,
whereas opposing values express conceptually diametrical goals in life. Thus,
individuals who put a high emphasis on values of universalism (social justice,
equality) would also tend to emphasize benevolence values (helpful, honest, et
cetera). People who emphasize universalism and benevolence would tend to deemphasize values that belong to opposing value types (achievement, for
example).

ACTION 388 (Talcott Parsons & Edward A. Shils eds., 1951); MILTON ROKEACH, THE NATURE OF
HUMAN VALUES (1973).
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Figure 1: The Structure of Relations Among Individual Values

The relationships between the ten values can be summarized in two basic
conflicts: self-enhancement versus self-transcendence and openness-to-change
versus conservation. Self-enhancement values focus on self-interest through the
pursuit of control over people and resources (power), and of competence and
success (achievement). These values conflict with self-transcendence values that
reflect concern for close others (benevolence) and for all people and nature
(universalism). Openness-to-change values reflect openness to what is new:
excitement and novelty (stimulation), and autonomy of thought and action
(self-direction). These values conflict with conservation values, which reflect a
strong preference to preserve the status quo through a commitment to past
beliefs and customs (tradition), adherence to social norms and expectations
(conformity), and stability for self and close others (security). Hedonism values
share elements of both openness-to-change and self-enhancement.
An alternative, more recent two-dimensional structure classifies values into
ones that regulate the expression of personal characteristics and interests
(person-focused: self-direction, stimulation, hedonism, achievement, and
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power) versus those that regulate relations with others and effects on them
(social-focused: universalism, benevolence, tradition, conformity, and security).5
Simultaneously, this classification groups values into those that express anxietyfree self-expansion (growth values: self-direction, universalism, benevolence,
stimulation, and hedonism) versus those that express anxiety-based selfprotection (protection values: security, power, achievement, conformity, and
tradition).
The ten basic values are intended to include all the core values recognized in
cultures around the world. Analyses of numerous samples from scores of
countries in every inhabited continent supported the discrimination of the ten
basic values and the two-dimensional structure, indicating that the model
provides an excellent representation of the average individual value structure
across literate cultures.6
B. Values, Behavior, and Other Factors
A growing number of studies link value priorities to behavior and social
roles. Several factors may be involved in mediating or moderating the causal
link from values to action.7 Yet, overall, as research on values progresses, it
becomes evident that people tend to make decisions and behave consistently
with their values. Although most of the evidence in this regard is correlational,
recent important studies show that activating values causes behavior.8
The types of behavior that exhibit relations with individuals’ value priorities
range from the very mundane to principled choices to life-changing decisions.
Similarly, conceptual consistency between value priorities and behavior has
been observed in experimental settings, among lay and professional samples,
and in national representative samples. In particular, value priorities correlate
with people’s daily behaviors.9 Values systematically associate with voting for

5. Shalom H. Schwartz, Basic Values: How They Motivate and Inhibit Prosocial Behavior, in
PROSOCIAL MOTIVES, EMOTIONS, AND BEHAVIOR 221, 226–28 (Mario Mikulincer & Phillip R. Shaver
eds., 2009).
6. See Shalom H. Schwartz & Klaus Boehnke, Evaluating the Structure of Human Values with
Confirmatory Factor Analysis, 38 J. RES. PERSONALITY 230, 232 (2004) (outlining a previous analysis
of over 200 samples from over sixty countries that identified the ten values in countries across the
world). For earlier stages of this project, see sources cited supra note 3.
7. A vast literature on judgment and decision-making analyzes the role of factors of this sort,
including boundaries on cognitive processes that may engender bounded rationality. For good
introductory sources, see HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT
(Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002); DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES
THAT SHAPE OUR DECISIONS (2008); Robyn M. Dawes, Behavioral Decision Making and Judgment, in
1 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 497 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998).
8. Bas Verplanken & Rob W. Holland, Motivated Decision-Making: Effects of Activation and
Self-Centrality of Values on Choices and Behavior, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 434 (2002);
Lilach Sagiv, Noga Sverdlik & Norbert Schwarz, To Compete or to Cooperate? Values’ Impact on
Perception and Action in Social Dilemma Games, 41 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 64 (2011).
9. Anat Bardi & Shalom H. Schwartz, Values and Behavior: Strength and Structure of Relations,
29 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1207 (2003).
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political parties whose agendas reflect voters’ values.10 The values that people
hold dear are compatible with their vocational interests and with their choices
between entrepreneurial self-employment versus salaried jobs.11 Board
members in public corporations exhibit a preference for strategic business
decisions that are consistent with their values.12 Finally, several studies link
value priorities with consumption choices and behaviors that are more
environmentally sensitive.13 Anecdotally, even buying an iPad associates with a
certain value profile.14
Finally, it deserves emphasizing that values also relate systematically to a set
of fundamental psychological factors mentioned here only in passing. Values
thus have been conceptualized as the core of personal identity.15 Value priorities
are associated with personality traits according to the “Big Five” model.16 Value
priorities correlate systematically with the need for cognitive closure.17 Finally,
value priorities correlate (modestly) with individual social axiom beliefs.18

10. See Shalom H. Schwartz, Value Priorities and Behavior: Applying a Theory of Integrated Value
Systems, in 8 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF VALUES: THE ONTARIO SYMPOSIUM 1, 10 (Clive Seligman, James
M. Olson & Mark P. Zanna eds., 1996); Marina F. Barnea & Shalom H. Schwartz, Values and Voting,
19 POL. PSYCHOL. 17 (1998); Gian Vittorio Caprara et al., Personality and Politics: Values, Traits, and
Political Choice, 27 POL. PSYCHOL. 1 (2006).
11. See Florian Noseleit, The Entrepreneurial Culture: Guiding Principles of the Self-Employed, in
ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND CULTURE 41 (Andreas Freytag & Roy Thurik eds., 2010); Lilach Sagiv,
Vocational Interests and Basic Values, 10 J. CAREER ASSESSMENT 233 (2002). On the link between
value acquisition in the family and career choices, see Steven Hitlin, Parental Influences on Children’s
Values and Aspirations: Bridging Two Theories of Social Class and Socialization, 49 SOC. PERSP. 25
(2006).
12. Renée B. Adams, Amir N. Licht & Lilach Sagiv, Shareholders and Stakeholders: How Do
Directors Decide?, STRATEGIC MGMT. J. (forthcoming 2011).
13. See generally Suzanne C. Grunert & Hans Jorn Juhl, Values, Environmental Attitudes, and
Buying of Organic Foods, 16 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 39 (1995); Annika M. Nordlund & Jorgen Garvill,
Values Structures Behind Proenvironmental Behavior, 34 ENV’T & BEHAV. 740 (2002); John Thøgersen
& Folke Ölander, Human Values and the Emergence of a Sustainable Consumption Pattern: A Panel
Study, 23 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 605 (2002). See also Judith I.M. de Groot & Linda Steg, Value
Orientations to Explain Beliefs Related to Environmental Significant Behavior: How to Measure
Egoistic, Altruistic, and Biospheric Value Orientations, 40 ENV’T & BEHAV. 330 (2008).
14. MYTYPE, THE PERSONALITY, VALUES AND DEMOGRAPHICS BEHIND CONSUMER OPINIONS
OF THE IPAD (2010), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/34438276/iPad-Opinion-Profile-byMyType-July-2010.
15. Steven Hitlin, Values as the Core of Personal Identity: Drawing Links Between Two Theories of
Self, 66 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 118 (2003).
16. Sonia Roccas et al., The Big Five Personality Factors and Personal Values, 28 PERSP. SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 789 (2002). On the Big Five model, see generally ROBERT R. MCCRAE & PAUL T.
COSTA, JR., PERSONALITY IN ADULTHOOD: A FIVE-FACTOR THEORY PERSPECTIVE (2d ed. 2003).
17. Renee B. Adams, Amir N. Licht & Lilach Sagiv, Shareholderism: Board Members’ Values and
the Shareholder-Stakeholder Dilemma (European Corp. Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No.
204/2008, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1118664 (explaining that, specifically, conservation
values correlate positively with need for closure, and openness-to-change values correlate negatively
with it).
18. Kwok Leung et al., Social Axioms and Values: A Cross-Cultural Examination, 21 EUR. J.
PERSONALITY 91 (2007).
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III
EXPANDED RATIONALITY: RECONCEPTUALIZING THE PREFERRED
During the past several years, the field of economics has reached a new
stage in the study of the boundaries of rationality. The field has grown in scope
such that “bounded rationality” and “behavioral economics” denote closely
related, but often independent, lines of work.19 In addition to documenting ever
more behavioral deviations from the predictions of the standard model and
suggesting models that might account for these deviations, writers growingly
call for theorizing at a higher level of generality. “For the field to advance
further,” argues one leading economist, “it should devote more attention to the
foundations of its models, and develop unified explanations for a wider range of
phenomena.”20
Efforts toward more general theorizing have proceeded on several fronts.
This part of the article presents two developments: (1) classifying the numerous
behavioral deviations from the standard model into broad categories of nonstandard preferences and (2) identifying processes that may systematically give
rise to variance of preferences.
A. Non-Standard Preferences
“Non-standard preferences” has become the standard term for the slew of
well-documented departures from the preference profile underlying the
standard model.21 Within this broad category, three to four objects of nonstandard preferences stand out: time, risk, ambiguity, and others. Not all
commentators refer to the full set, however, as preference (or aversion) toward
ambiguity is the least-discussed type.22 This section reviews advances in the

19. Glenn Ellison, Bounded Rationality in Industrial Organization, in 2 ADVANCES IN ECONOMICS
ECONOMETRICS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS, NINTH WORLD CONGRESS 142, 142 (Richard
Blundell, Whitney K. Newey & Torsten Persson eds., 2006); Drew Fudenberg, Advancing Beyond
“Advances in Behavioral Economics,” 44 J. ECON. LITERATURE 694 (2006).
20. Fudenberg, supra note 19, at 694. See also Colin E. Camerer, Behavioral Economics, in 2
ADVANCES IN ECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS, NINTH WORLD
CONGRESS 181, 191 (Richard Blundell, Whitney K. Newey & Torsten Persson, eds., 2006); Colin F.
Camerer & George Loewenstein, Behavioral Economics: Past, Present, Future, in ADVANCES IN
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 3, 14 (Colin F. Camerer et al. eds., 2004); Wolfgang Pesendorfer,
Behavioral Economics Comes of Age: A Review Essay on Advances in Behavioral Economics, 44 J.
ECON. LITERATURE 712, 720 (2006).
21. See Stefano DellaVigna, Psychology and Economics: Evidence from the Field, 47 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 315 (2009).
22. See id.; Sendhil Mullainathan & Richard H. Thaler, Behavioral Economics, in 2
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL & BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 1094 (2001) (focusing on
time, risk, and other-regarding preferences); George F. Loewenstein & Ted O’Donoghue, Animal
Spirits: Affective and Deliberative Processes in Economic Behavior (May 2005), available at
http://www.arts.cornell.edu/econ/edo1/will.pdf (discussing time, risk, and other-regarding preferences);
Camerer, supra note 20 (focusing on the time, risk, ambiguity, and self-interest preferences).
AND

LICHT

Spring 2011]

2/2/2011

LAW FOR THE COMMON MAN

183

study of other-regarding preferences and of ambiguity preferences, as they are
most pertinent to the theory of values.
1. Other-Regarding Preferences
Though a good deal has been written in the behavioral law and economics
literature about possible legal implications of various behavioral biases
(endowment, availability, et cetera), the legal discourse has been most affected
by progress in behavioral economic research on other-regarding preferences.
For most legal scholars, homo economicus—that notorious expected-utility
maximizing (straw) man—is first and foremost a keenly self-interested person
and, only secondly, an exponentially time-discounting one. And this is perfectly
understandable. The standard model of rationality is not merely a descriptive
model; it is also a normative theory about how people should behave if they are
to be deemed rational (by the criteria of this theory, that is). As such, one could
justifiably see the standard model as challenging other normative theories of
behavior based on morality and ethics, which are so central to the law.
A large body of evidence shows that people may systematically incur
substantial costs to promote other people’s interests or just “to make a point.”23
Stated otherwise, people regularly seem to care about others in the
societyhence the terms “social preferences” and “other-regarding
preferences.”24 Particular other-regarding preferences have been dubbed
“fairness,” “reciprocity,” et cetera.25 At the basis of this literature lies a general
postulate: that other people’s utility enters into one’s own utility function in a
non-trivial way. In order to avoid tautology, economists need to suggest
functional forms that represent the content, or structure, of other-regarding
preferences. Joel Sobel, in a survey of other-regarding preferences, argues that
the notion of preferences should be expanded by relaxing the assumption of
individual greed.26 Sobel writes a simple general expression of individual utility
that reflects this notion—ui(O(s);(s;θ))—where θ (theta) is the pivotal variable

23. See generally Colin Camerer & Ernst Fehr, When Does “Economic Man” Dominate Social
Behavior?, 311 SCI. 47 (2006); Matthew Rabin, A Perspective on Psychology and Economics, 46 EUR.
ECON. REV. 657 (2002).
24. Many economic discussions confusingly employ “social preferences” to denote “otherregarding preferences.” This usage intermixes preferences of individuals with regard to other members
of society with preferences of social groups. The latter type of preferences is highly problematic from
an economic theory perspective, if not utterly denied. Yet this is not the case from the vantage point of
psychology or other social sciences even if one prefers not to ascribe faculties of choice, tastes, and
preferences to social groups. I, therefore, prefer the neutral term other-regarding preferences.
25. See, e.g., Joyce Berg, John Dickhaut & Kevin McCabe, Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History,
10 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 122 (1995); Matthew Rabin, Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and
Economics, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 1281 (1993).
26. Joel Sobel, Interdependent Preferences and Reciprocity, 43 J. ECON. LITERATURE 392, 392
(2005).
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as it describes personal characteristics.27 This expression allows for an
individual’s utility to depend on outcomes that take into account
interdependent utilities; it could also include elements that cannot be measured
directly, “like a warm glow from giving.”28 Theta formalizes the idea that people
differ in the utility they derive from different (broadly defined) outcomes.
Furthermore, θ may be interpreted as equivalent to the concept of identity.29
A common approach for demonstrating other-regarding preferences is to
theorize a utility function from intuitive principles and support it with consistent
experimental results.30 Ernst Fehr and Klaus Schmidt advance a model featuring
an aversion toward less equal outcomes.31 In this model, people are willing to
give up some material payoff to move in the direction of more equal outcomes.
Gary Charness and Matthew Rabin conceptualize people’s preference for
fairness as consisting of their own individual utility and two additional
components:32 One component is a Rawlsian maxim in care for the least
advantaged in the society; the second component represents a universalistic
concern for the total income of all societal members, equally weighted. The
latter component may be viewed as a preference for general efficiency or social
welfare. A third component based on reciprocity is added to account for
retaliatory actions. We return to Sobel’s θ and to these functional forms below.
2. Preferences Over the Unknown: Uncertainty and Ambiguity Aversion
Individuals’ behavior under uncertainty exhibits systematic departures from
the standard model of rational choice. Uncertainty is defined as the category of
unknown events about which one does not have an estimate of the probabilities
of their occurrence.33 Research indicates that people have an ambiguity

27. In this formulation,  is a parameter; s = (s1, . . . , si) is strategy profile (that is, individual i
chooses si); O(s) denotes those generalized consumption goods whose production does not depend on θ
and (s; θ). Id. at 402.
28. Id. See generally James Andreoni, Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory
of Warm-Glow Giving, 100 ECON. J. 464 (1990); James Andreoni, Privately Provided Public Goods in a
Large Economy: The Limits of Altruism, 35 J. PUB. ECON. 57 (1988). See also Uzi Segal & Joel Sobel,
Tit for Tat: Foundations of Preferences for Reciprocity in Strategic Settings, 136 J. ECON. THEORY 197
(2007).
29. For an economic modeling of identity, see George A. Akerlof & Rachel E. Kranton,
Economics and Identity, 115 Q.J. ECON. 715 (2000). See also Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, Identity,
Morals and Taboos: Beliefs as Assets, 126 Q.J. Econ. (forthcoming 2011), available at http://idei.fr/
doc/by/tirole/identity2010_june.pdf.
30. See Ernst Fehr & Klaus Schmidt, The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism—
Experimental Evidence and New Theories, in 1 HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF GIVING,
ALTRUISM AND RECIPROCITY 615 (Serge-Christophe Kolm & Jean Mercier Ythier eds., 2006).
31. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation, 114 Q.J.
ECON. 817 (1999). See also Gary E. Bolton & Axel Ockenfels, ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity,
and Competition, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 166 (2000).
32. Gary Charness & Matthew Rabin, Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests, 117 Q.J.
ECON. 817 (2002). See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 154–56 (1971) (discussing the maxim in
care principle).
33. FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 19–20, 227 (1921).
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aversion, also referred to as uncertainty aversion, which is distinguished from
risk aversion.34 When asked to choose among future outcomes, people ascribe
lower utilities to outcomes about which they do not know the probability of risk
levels.35 Furthermore, a theoretical distinction has been made between objective
rationality and subjective rationality in connection with ambiguity.36 Which
rationality holds may depend on the individual’s culture or personality.37
Ambiguity aversion leads people to behave more conservatively.38 Another
important outcome of ambiguity aversion, among numerous others, is
incomplete contracts.39 Interestingly, contract incompleteness associates directly
with bounded rationality based on the insight that designing contractual
covenants is cognitively costly.40 But ambiguity aversion also reflects a
(negative) taste or preference for the unknowable; the ambiguous may be
threatening and had rather be avoided.
B. Constructed Preferences
Another major challenge to the standard model of rational choice is the
discovery that individuals’ preferences are context-contingent. They are
constructed in a contingent fashion, rather than being fixed, comprehensive,
and well-ranked.41 Moreover, preference construction may have an underlying
mechanism such that there could be factors that may systematically cause
people to resort to certain modes of decision-making.42 In the present context,
we are interested in a special category of strategies for preference construction
that involve reason-based choices. Here, individuals seek reasons to justify their
choices and explain them to others. In a more general account of reason-based
choice, individuals address difficult decisions—ones that involve conflict

34. See, e.g., Uzi Segal, The Ellsberg Paradox and Risk Aversion: An Anticipated Utility Approach,
28 INT’L ECON. REV. 175 (1987).
35. See Yoram Halevy, Ellsberg Revisited: An Experimental Study, 75 ECONOMETRICA 503 (2007).
36. Itzhak Gilboa, Fabio Maccheroni, Massimo Marinacci & David Schmeidler, Objective and
Subjective Rationality in a Multiple Prior Model, 78 ECONOMETRICS 755 (2008).
37. Id. at 756.
38. Sujoy Mukerji, A Survey of Some Applications of the Idea of Ambiguity Aversion in Economics,
24 INT’L J. APPROXIMATE REASONING 221, 222 (2000).
39. Sujoy Mukerji, Ambiguity Aversion and Incompleteness of Contractual Form, 88 AM. ECON.
REV. 1207 (1998).
40. Jean Tirole, Cognition and Incomplete Contracts, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 265 (2009).
41. Paul Slovic, The Construction of Preferences, 50 AM. PSYCHOL. 364, 369 (1995) (“As a result of
[] mental gymnastics, decision making is a highly contingent form of information processing, sensitive
to task complexity, time pressure, response mode, framing, reference points, and numerous other
contextual factors.”). See also Gregory W. Fischer et al., Goal-based Construction of Preferences: Task
Goals and the Prominence Effect, 45 MGMT. SCI. 1057 (1999); Dan Ariely et al., Tom Sawyer and the
Construction of Value, 60 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 1 (2006).
42. The obligatory citation is to Herbert A. Simon, Rational Choice and the Structure of the
Environment, 63 PSYCHOL. REV. 129, 130 (1956) (describing a mental process dubbed “satisfycing”
that may stem from one’s needs, drives, or goals; this process is applicable to any organism). For
further sources, see supra note 7.
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between several good options or conflicting reasons for competing options—by
seeking reasons to decide in a particular way.43 When people make decisions,
they consider not only their preferences for different alternatives, but also
guiding principles and behavioral rules. In other words, they follow
“rationales”—meta-rules and principles.44 Importantly, rules relate to social
norms, which may be seen as sitting higher in the hierarchy of reasons than
preferences.
Finally, in a conceptual paper that also deals with hierarchies of motivations,
Keith Stanovich recently defined a “master rationality motive” (MRM) as a
distinctive thinking disposition at a high level of generality. The MRM is the
“motive that drives the search for rational integration across our preference
hierarchies.”45 The MRM is the “desire to act in accordance with reasons, a
desire that produces behavior, in your name, by adding its motivational force to
that of whichever motives appear to provide the strongest reasons for acting.”46
The MRM does not refer to how well people satisfy the choice axioms of utility
theory, which may be called a “thin theory of rationality.”47 Rather, the MRM
refers to a “broad theory of rationality” that encompasses self-criticism of one’s
own desires and beliefs.48
C. Toward Expanded Rationality
The scholarly advances mentioned above point to the need for expanding
the standard notion of rationality and, in fact, show that economists are already
making progress in this direction. These “new rational preferences” are more
individually subjective than the preferences postulated by the standard model.
These new preferences are also more socially sensitive, as they take others more
systematically into account. They are contextual, depending on the
informational environment as well as on the social environment of norms and
shared beliefs. These new preferences, moreover, seem to be linked to deep
mental processes that may be common to several phenomena. These new
preferences thus turn the focus from rationalizing choice decisions on formal
bases to justifying them with good reasons.

43. Eldar Shafir, Itamar Simonson & Amos Tversky, Reason-Based Choice, 49 COGNITION 11
(1993).
44. On Amir & Dan Ariely, Decisions by Rules: The Case of Unwillingness to Pay for Beneficial
Delays, 44 J. MARKETING RES. 142, 143 (2007).
45. Keith E. Stanovich, Higher-Order Preferences and the Master Rationality Motive, 14 THINKING
& REASONING 111, 119 (2008).
46. Id. (quoting J.D. Velleman, What Happens When Somebody Acts?, 101 MIND 461, 479 (1992)).
47. Id. at 121.
48. Stanovich’s idea of contingent ordering of motivations according to a higher-level ranking is
reminiscent of Amartya Sen’s concept of meta-ranking; namely, a ranking of sets of preference
orderings according to some moral principle. See AMARTYA SEN, CHOICE, WELFARE AND
MEASUREMENT 100–01 (1982); AMARTYA SEN, RATIONALITY AND FREEDOM 17–18 (2002).
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Behavioral economics, however, so far has failed to consider a general
framework for analyzing individuals’ motivational goals—what may be called
“the desirable.” For those who seek such a framework in their pursuit of a more
general theory of rationality, values may be the Holy Grail, sweeping as this
assertion must sound. As conceptions of the desirable, values may provide a
good framework for expanding the concept of rationality beyond the confines
of the traditional model, while preserving parsimony and theoretical rigor and
allowing for deriving testable hypotheses. This section suggests aspects in which
the theory of values complements current accounts in behavioral economics and
aspects in which the former may be used to expand the latter.
1. Values-Based Utility
One will find it difficult to miss the remarkable overlap between the nature
of values and the grounds that behavioral economists seek for expanding the
frontiers of rationality. The values model appears to satisfy the requirement
mentioned above for psychological observations that apply generally. The
theoretical model provides a concise yet complete model of human
motivational goals. The ten values and their interrelations may point the way
toward a unifying theory of human motivation—a way for organizing the
different needs, motives, and goals proposed by other theories.49 The model
transcends situations, well beyond economic exchanges, and has been validated
to hold nearly universally.
The values model thus can mesh well in, and further enrich, current
economic models. Consider Sobel’s θ.50 Theta comprises the individual’s
personal characteristics—in particular, how one assesses different outcomes and
the utility one derives from these outcomes. Yet θ is only a receptacle; it should
be written θ(·) to denote that it has arguments. To be meaningful, θ(·) must
encompass a comprehensive, yet final, set of goals and criteria with which to
assess outcomes. This is precisely the role of values. Representing the set of
conceptions of the desirable, the distinct ten values in the values model can be
seen as ten distinct arguments in individuals’ utility functions—as thetas with
ten different subscripts. This article will also generalize Sobel’s account from
one dealing only with other-regarding preferences to a full account of all the
individual motivational goals.51
The contribution of the values theory lies in defining a finite set of
arguments that are both universal and comprehensive. It may enable a modeler
to avoid the pitfalls of tautology—namely, allowing anything and everything
into the definition of utility, or writing a different model for each case. Granted,
there may be many issues that different people in different social groups may

49. Schwartz, supra note 5.
50. Sobel, supra notes 26, 27.
51. Additional subscripted thetas could refer to other universal individual factors, for example,
beliefs. See Leung, supra note 18.
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consider important, desirable, legitimate, and so forth. The theory and evidence
indicate that these issues would fall into one of the ten domains in the model—
that is, that there is “no motivation left behind.” In tandem, many particular
values may be idiosyncratic to certain national or local groups (thus falling into
different domains in samples from different groups), and therefore should not
be used in a general model. In such cases, the model would indicate that these
values—and the respective preferences they correlate with—may be
inappropriate for analytical use beyond those groups.
In addition to identifying motivationally distinct values, the theory also
specifies a structure of values, namely, the dynamics of conflict and congruence
among them. These dynamics are backed by concrete cross-correlation
matrices. Economists seeking to make their models more attuned to insights
from psychology thus may want to incorporate this feature into the models. For
example, consider a purely altruistic behavior: making an anonymous donation
to a non-governmental organization that runs a clinic in a developing country.
Such behavior will be more likely among people high in universalism. The
structural features of the model suggest that this behavior will be less likely
among individuals who put a high priority on power, which also encompasses
wealth attainment. This highlights the fact that values may operate both as
“pull” (positive valence) factors for behaviors that are conceptually compatible,
and as “push” (negative valence) for incompatible behaviors. The model further
suggests that this behavior will be unrelated to security values, for instance, and
to value priorities on the conservation versus openness-to-change dimension
more generally.
2. Other-Regarding Preferences
It requires little effort to observe the conceptual link between selftranscendence values and other-regarding preferences, or the link between selfenhancement values and self-utility in the traditional expected-utility
maximization model. The values theory again may enrich the economic
accounts through its structural features. Self-regarding preferences comprise
seeking pure pleasure for oneself, which corresponds with hedonistic values, as
well as other forms of attaining both material and non-material utility, which is
covered by achievement and partially by power values. So these issues are
related, as one would expect, but also distinct from one another.
On the opposite pole of this dimension, the values theory distinguishes two
types of other-regarding motivations. Altruistic preferences directed to
particular others from one’s in-group are conceptually compatible with
benevolence values. More open-ended other-regarding preferences are
compatible with Schwartz’s universalism. Among current models of otherregarding preferences, Charness and Rabin’s model better captures the notion
of universalism, especially through the factor of caring for the total utility and
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welfare in society, but also through the Rawlsian caring for a (presumably
random) least-advantaged member of society.52 This model nonetheless fails to
consider utility derived from caring for impersonal objects such as the
environment. The values theory and evidence suggest that similar motivations
may lie behind this type of utility. In comparison, Fehr and Schmidt’s model
revolves around the inequality between an individual’s income and the income
of others.53 This model is silent on the question whether the “others” whose
income one considers do or do not belong to one’s in-group. Indeed, the model
fits results from anonymous Ultimatum and other games. It therefore fails to
reflect the difference between benevolence and universal motivations.
3. Uncertainty and Ambiguity Aversion
Next, consider uncertainty and ambiguity aversion. This type of preference
is conceptually compatible with high priority on conservation values, while
lower ambiguity aversion is compatible with openness-to-change. People who,
relative to others, put a high priority on having new experiences (stimulation)
and on independently guiding their own life (self-direction) would be more
willing to face unforeseeable contingencies. In contrast, people for whom
security, stability, and order (security, tradition) are of high importance would
see the unpredictable as threatening and aversive. The emphasis on preserving
the status quo—whether real or an imaginary ideal-type (for example,
“protecting family values”)—is especially clear in such value items as respect
for tradition, honoring parents and elders, and social order. The preference for
certainty and stability over ambiguity and change is also reflected in seemingly
innocuous value items, like cleanliness, that convey a sense of clarity.54
More broadly, values that express prevention-of-loss goals stand against
values expressing promotion-of-gain goals (see Figure 1). This distinction draws
on a theory of regulatory focus.55 In this theory, hedonic preferences are not
continuous. Rather, the domain of losses—in particular, loss avoidance—is
distinct from the domain of gains, specifically, gain approach.56 (The link to
Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory had been noted.)57 This broad
distinction parallels another distinction—between anxiety-based values and
anxiety-free values. The values theory thus suggests that uncertainty and

52. Charness & Rabin, supra note 32.
53. Fehr & Schmidt, supra note 30.
54. Cf. John T. Jost et al., Political Conservatism as Motivated Social Cognition, 129 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 339, 346 (2003).
55. E. Tory Higgins, Beyond Pleasure and Pain, 52 AM. PSYCHOL. 1280 (1997).
56. Id. See also Vered Halamish et al., Regulatory Focus Effects on Discounting over Uncertainty
for Losses vs. Gains, 29 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 654 (2008); Lorraine Chen Idson, Nira Liberman & E. Tory
Higgins, Distinguishing Gains from Nonlosses and Losses from Nongains: A Regulatory Focus
Perspective on Hedonic Intensity, 36 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 252 (2000); Leigh Ann Vaughn,
Jolie Baumann & Christine Klemann, Openness to Experience and Regulatory Focus: Evidence of
Motivation from Fit, 42 J. RES. PERSONALITY 886 (2008).
57. Higgins, supra note 55, at 1293.
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ambiguity will be more threatening among individuals who, relative to others,
emphasize power, security, conformity, and tradition. These people will be
more likely to prefer actions and policies that promise to sustain order and
avoid the need to face uncertainty. The opposite will be true for people who are
high on self-direction and universalism.58
This broad distinction can be further extended to values that express
complexity aversion versus values that express comfort with complexity.59 The
pivotal observation here is that complex situations involving many alternatives
or several conflicting considerations resemble ambiguous situations. Decisionmaking in such situations is more cognitively taxing.60 In the context of political
ideology, Philip Tetlock defined individuals’ integrative complexity as the
extent of differentiation among multiple perspectives or dimensions and the
higher order integration or synthesis of these differentiated components.61 In the
economic literature, too, complexity in choice decisions has been shown to
invoke negative responses.62
The foregoing suggests that uncertainty, ambiguity, and complexity overlap
somewhat. With too many moving parts to follow, people lose focus, the picture
blurs, and ambiguity reigns supreme. Since everybody is cognitively bounded,
everybody, at some point, “satisfices” when facing a complex or ambiguous
situation. We can therefore consider self-transcendence and openness-tochange as high-complexity values, as they call for contemplating numerous
(sometimes conflicting) objects, and for accommodating uncertainty and
ambiguity. Conservation and self-enhancement can be considered as lowcomplexity values, as they call for focusing on fewer objects—primarily
oneself—and for avoiding uncertainty and ambiguity.
People indeed differ in their modes of addressing ambiguous or complex
situations. These differences stem from individual traits and from situational
factors. A series of studies demonstrated the effect of both channels.
Individuals’ dislike of integratively complex alternatives correlates positively

58. The link to political ideologies has been surveyed extensively. See Jost et al., supra note 54.
59. Amir N. Licht, The Maximands of Corporate Governance: A Theory of Values and Cognitive
Style, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 649, 668 (2004).
60. JOHN W. PAYNE, JAMES R. BETTMAN & ERIC J. JOHNSON, THE ADAPTIVE DECISION MAKER
29–41 (1993). See also James R. Bettman, Eric J. Johnson & John W. Payne, A Componential Analysis
of Cognitive Effort in Choice, 45 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 111 (1990).
61. See Philip E. Tetlock, Cognitive Style and Political Ideology, 45 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 118 (1983); Philip E. Tetlock, Cognitive Style and Political Belief Systems in the British House
of Commons, 46 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 365 (1984).
62. See Doron Sonsino & Marvin Mandelbaum, On Preference for Flexibility and Complexity
Aversion—Experimental Evidence, 51 THEORY & DECISION 197 (2001); Doron Sonsino, Uri Benzion
& Galit Mador, The Complexity Effects on Choice with Uncertainty—Experimental Evidence, 112
ECON. J. 936, 937 (2002).
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with a higher need for cognitive closure63 and with conservative political
ideologies.64 A higher level of integrative complexity correlates positively with
higher priorities on self-transcendence values and negatively with emphasizing
self-enhancement values.65 Higher need for closure correlates highly positively
with conservation values (security, tradition, and conformity) and highly
negatively with openness-to-change values (stimulation and self-direction).66
Moreover, as the level of need for cognitive closure rises, people are more likely
to fall back on “standard solutions” to problems suggested by their culture. In
ambiguous, complex social interactions, cultural norms provide easily accessible
heuristics for reaching satisfactory solutions because they can be easily
justified.67
4. Preference Construction and Related Mechanisms
Let us now turn to the remaining issues identified in the literature as
developments in, or challenges to, the standard model of rationality. The values
theory provides a general framework, within which one can situate the concept
of preference construction and related concepts. To the extent that preference
construction is guided by reasons or principles, and behavioral rules informed
by culture and social norms, values define both the vocabulary for, and the
intensity of, these factors.
Recasting Stanovich’s MRM in a values mold yields particularly fruitful
observations. At the heart of this “desire to act in accordance with reasons,”
there lies a process seeking “that of whichever motives appear to provide the
strongest reasons for acting.”68 What makes the MRM unique is its meta(“master”) rationality character—the ability to engage in self-criticism, to
consider conceptually conflicting goals, and to apply higher-order preferences
to them.69 As trans-situational goals or criteria, values define higher-order
preferences. The values theory—in particular, the circular model of values—
provides structure to the notion of conflicting goals and low-level preferences as
it postulates the relationships of conflict and congruence among values. When

63. See ARIE W. KRUGLANSKI, LAY EPISTEMICS AND HUMAN KNOWLEDGE: COGNITIVE AND
MOTIVATIONAL BASES 14 (1989) (defining the need for cognitive closure as “the desire for a definite
answer on some topic, any answer as opposed to confusion and ambiguity”).
64. Philip E. Tetlock, Cognitive Biases and Organizational Correctives: Do Both Disease and Cure
Depend on the Ideological Beholder?, 45 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 293 (2000).
65. Liisa Myyry, Everyday Value Conflicts and Integrative Complexity of Thought, 43
SCANDINAVIAN J. PSYCHOL. 385 (2002).
66. Adams, Licht & Sagiv, supra note 17.
67. See Chi-yue Chiu, Michael W. Morris, Ying-yi Hong & Tanya Menon, Motivated Cultural
Cognition: The Impact of Implicit Theories on Dispositional Attribution Varies as a Function of Need for
Closure, 78 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 247 (2000); Jean H.Y. Fu et al., Epistemic Motives and
Cultural Conformity: Need for Closure, Culture, and Context as Determinants of Conflict Judgments, 92
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 191 (2007).
68. Stanovich, supra note 45.
69. Id. at 121–22.
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the MRM mulls over conflicting goals, it essentially deliberates which actions
are more in line with the values one cherishes.
In tandem, the MRM theory explicates how the values model can support a
theory of expanded rationality notwithstanding the fact that this model does not
satisfy the requirement for consistency as stipulated in the traditional model of
procedural rationality.70 Both the values and the MRM theories indeed
repudiate this requirement. Both theories postulate that, in situations laden
with meaning—a category that is far broader than those situations whose
outcome can be quantified in some commensurable way—conflicting
motivations may point to conflicting (or at least inconsistent) behaviors. Which
motivation will prevail may depend on peripheral circumstances, in breach of
the traditional model but in keeping with the values and the MRM model. For
example, an individual may cherish her personal independence as part of her
special emphasis on self-direction. But when this individual’s security is
threatened (including through experimental priming) she may forego a selfexpressing behavior to preserve security. This would not prove that she is
irrational. It would suggest, as Stanovich emphasizes, that she is meta-rational
and demonstrate the usefulness of the expanded rationality framework
advanced here.

IV
LAW: UNDERSTANDING THE REQUIRED
Drawing on the analytical framework developed in the preceding parts, this
part argues that a values-based theory of expanded rationality can make a
significant contribution to our understanding of the law. The key point is that
the law deals with the desirable. Jurisprudence scholars have been discussing
the relations between law and morality, the greater good, or religious
injunctions for generations. This is not the subject of the present discussion.
Without going into too much detail, it appears reasonable to assume that the
law expresses a stance about the way things ought to be, including the structure
of social institutions and individuals’ behavior. The law is a system of
prescriptive norms, not descriptive ones. There is therefore a close conceptual
proximity between the law and values as conceptions of the desirable. The
better we understand how individuals perceive and deal with the desirable, the
better we can analyze the law as the central social institution intended for
guiding people’s behavior toward socially desirable goals; a fortiori for
economic analysis of law.
This part demonstrates the link between values, expanded rationality, and
the law through a number of central issues concerning both the content of the
law and its operation. Specifically, this part deals with legal rules of conduct,
law abidingness, implications of value diversity in society, and value conflict. It

70. I am grateful to Avishalom Tor for raising this important point.
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will demonstrate the potential contribution of this mode of analysis to
understanding how the law operates. As will become clear below, the present
account is not a normative theory, among other things, because the present
account clarifies that what people consider normative or desirable may depend
on their values. Furthermore, it should be emphasized that the present
discussion concentrates on the individual level of analysis. This part deals with
the way individuals perceive the desirable (through values) and the individual
perspective to the law—that is, “law for the common man.” References to
forming legal policy will be from this perspective as well. One could discuss the
content of the law and the rule of law—as opposed to law abidingness—as
social institutions at the societal level of analysis, but this would be a separate
and different analysis from the present one.71
A. Values and the Content of Law
Similar to the general economic literature, the law and economics literature
relies on the narrow, yet theoretically sound, foundations of the standard
model. The values-based expanded rationality approach presented here does
not dispute the basic premise that people respond to incentives. A standard
economic analysis of a legal issue seeks to investigate how different legal
mechanisms may guide behavior. Such an analysis might help private parties to
better plan their moves and assist lawmakers in designing legal reform with a
view to influence individuals’ behavior, for example, in order to maximize total
social welfare, effect a more just distribution of resources, or some other
normative criterion.
A values-based expanded rationality expands, in a structured manner, the
notion of individual utility and the incentives one faces by defining a diverse set
of potentially desirable values. This diversity allows for diversity of goals within
individuals and groups. For individuals, a diversity of values enables one to
analyze incentives in light of the conceptual meaning of the law, and not only in
light of its material cost or benefit or the hedonic pleasure or pain that it may
bring about. When an individual faces a certain legal rule, that rule affects her
payoffs according to the values that it invokes and the individual’s preferences
with regard to such values.
For example, consider a law imposing a sales tax on automobiles. In terms
of material payoffs, the tax sets an identical incentive for all individuals in the
society as a regular monetary cost (putting aside differences in income levels
and marginal utility of income). This is the standard economic analysis. Now

71. For a theoretical analysis, see generally Amir N. Licht, Social Norms and the Law: Why Peoples
Obey the Law, 4 REV. L. & ECON. 715 (2008). For empirical evidence on the link between cultural
values and the content of law and the rule of law, see generally Amir N. Licht, Chanan Goldschmidt &
Shalom H. Schwartz, Culture, Law, and Corporate Governance, 25 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 229 (2005);
Amir N. Licht, Chanan Goldschmidt & Shalom H. Schwartz, Culture Rules: The Foundations of the
Rule of Law and Other Norms of Governance, 35 J. COMP. ECON. 659 (2007).
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assume that this tax is a “green tax” such that higher polluting automobiles and
those with less efficient gas consumption are subject to it. In the standard
economic analysis, nothing changes unless we add an ad hoc tautological
assumption about a special taste for environmental protection. In contrast, a
values-based expanded rationality points to an additional utility deriving from
universalism values, which encompass the environment—an effect that a regular
sales tax does not engender. Andrew Green, in fact, argues that monetary
incentives in the form of subsidies may “crowd out” (dampen) the impact of
environmental values and that environmental protection norms should be
internalized through values.72
In fact, a substantial part of the law—perhaps most of it—may be perceived
by individuals as only marginally relevant from a pecuniary point of view but of
utmost significance in other respects. Defining the utility that people derive
from numerous laws cannot persuasively be based on the standard model. The
quintessential example for this kind of law is the freedom of expression. In the
vast scholarly and jurisprudential discussion on freedom of expression, two
major rationales for its legal protection have been advanced: one dealing with
the public aspect73 and one that focuses on the individual aspect. Courts and
scholars have conceptualized the individual-based rationale as “self-fulfillment”
or “individual self-realization.”74 Citing a powerful line of authorities, Justice
Stevens recently summarized the individual-based rationale: “One fundamental
concern of the First Amendment is to ‘protec[t] the individual’s interest in selfexpression.’ Freedom of speech helps ‘make men free to develop their
faculties,’ it respects their ‘dignity and choice,’ and it facilitates the value of
‘individual self-realization.’”75
In term of its conceptual content meaning, freedom of expression reflects
primarily the value of self-direction. Freedom of expression is conceptually
consistent with notions of independence, liberty, creativity, and curiosity, which
reflect this value in the Schwartz model. Freedom of expression, in its bolder
version—for example, in artistic works—also expresses the value of stimulation,
which is reflected in notions of novelty, excitement, and variety. Justice
Stevens’s proposition constitutes a descriptive, empirical assertion that self-

72. Andrew Green, You Can't Pay Them Enough: Subsidies, Environmental Law, and Social
Norms, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 407, 408 (2006).
73. The public rationale for freedom of expression relates to its pivotal role in the democratic
process and is often associated with the metaphor of market of ideas. See Abrams v. United States, 250
U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE (1960).
74. See Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877,
878–87 (1963) (self-fulfillment); Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591
(1982) (self-realization). See also Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25
UCLA L. REV. 964 (1978) (liberty); Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 204 (1972) (autonomy).
75. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 972 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(internal citations omitted).

LICHT

Spring 2011]

2/2/2011

LAW FOR THE COMMON MAN

195

direction is a universal value—one that is recognized and appreciated by all
individuals—as well as a normative claim that the law should protect people’s
ability to realize this value. Freedom of expression may have socially beneficial
implications—for example, for the democratic process—and it may also have
material implications, such as for commercial purposes, as in the market for
artworks. But the latter facets do not exhaust the values of self-direction and
stimulation such that any analysis of the freedom of expression that ignores
these values will be lacking and will likely yield skewed policy implications.
These two examples—the “green” tax and freedom of expression—
demonstrate how the content of the law may reflect different values. These
examples refer to values located on the two higher-level dimensions in the
values circle: universalism on the self-transcendence pole and self-direction on
the openness-to-change pole. Other laws may reflect other values, and in many
cases, more than one value. The circular model of values suggests that when a
certain law more powerfully expresses (that is, is conceptually consistent with) a
particular value, it is more likely to similarly express, albeit more weakly, the
adjacent values on the circle and be conceptually opposed to the values located
on the opposite part of the circle.
B. Values and Obeying the Law
One of the most successful propositions in the economic analysis of law is
Gary Becker’s seminal model of deterrence.76 Becker has shown how law
abidingness (avoidance of crime) may depend positively on the magnitude of
the sanction imposed for the offense and on the probability of imposing this
sanction, namely, the probability of finding the perpetrator, convicting, and
punishing her. Becker’s model is purely economic—a model of incentives.
Becker’s article spawned voluminous scholarship on economic analysis of
criminal law, which need not be surveyed here as it shares with Becker’s
original article the basic reasonable premise that, like any other activity,
criminal activity responds to incentives. This holds true for negative incentives
that are either material, such as fines, or hedonic, such as incarceration.
Notwithstanding the model’s solid internal logic, which renders it so convincing,
some empirical evidence questions the effectiveness of deterrence in
engendering legal compliance. For instance, Robert MacCoun has found that
deterrence may account for only five percent of the variability of criminal
activity.77
Starting in the mid-1990s, law and economics began, and has continued, to
expand the analysis of compliance by referring to social incentives of shaming

76. Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968).
77. Robert J. MacCoun, Drugs and the Law: A Psychological Analysis of Drug Prohibition, 113
PSYCHOL. BULL. 497 (1993).
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and stigma.78 The central idea motivating this discourse is that, even in the
absence of material or hedonic incentives—when standard deterrence for fear
of the law is unlikely because fines are negligible and the probability of arrest
and conviction is low—people may nonetheless obey the law in order to avoid
public shame. In contrast with regular enforcement mechanisms of police forces
and prisons, shaming is cheap. On its face, shaming does not require any
resources—especially not state resources—beyond means for disseminating
information about the shameful conduct.
Shaming could either serve as a substitute for standard enforcement through
deterrence or as a complement to it.79 Be that as it may, however, from the
standpoint of the potential shamer, who must deliberate whether to shame
someone because the latter has breached the law, the key question is whether
one should obey the law. Even if one assumes that the cost of shaming is zero,
or close to that—indeed, especially when no material incentives exist—one
should still point to the motivational factors that cause societal members
actually to shame offenders. Even an economic analysis that is not based on
regular deterrence has to identify a mechanism that motivates legal compliance
and engenders a perception of legal compliance as desirable in the eyes of
societal members, who are expected to obey the law—especially in the eyes of
potential shaming agents and their audience.80
Lawrence Kohlberg has related law abidingness with stages of moral
development.81 At the pre-conventional stage of Kohlberg’s theory, children
obey for fear of punishment, which is similar to the standard deterrence-based

78. See, e.g., Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, Incentives and Prosocial Behavior, 96 AM. ECON.
REV. 1652 (2006); Patricia Funk, On the Effective Use of Stigma as Crime Deterrent. 48 EUR. ECON.
REV. 715 (2004); Stephen P. Garvey, Can Shaming Punishments Educate?, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 733
(1998); Toni M. Massaro, The Meanings of Shame Implications for Legal Reform, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL’Y & L. 645 (1997). For an analysis of the limits of enforcement through stigma, see Alon Harel &
Alon Klement, The Economics of Stigma: Why More Detection of Crime May Result in Less
Stigmatization, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 355 (2007).
79. For economic analyses of such substitute–complementary relations between the law and social
norms, see, for example, Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585
(1998); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV.
338 (1997); Yoshinobu Zasu, Sanctions by Social Norms and the Law: Substitutes or Complements?, 36
J. LEGAL STUD. 379 (2007).
80. The problem of the motivation to obey the law does not change when we add incentives to the
mechanisms that promote compliance through social sanctions, provided that sanctions are costly.
Social sanctioning through shaming is common, especially in close-knit or well-defined communities.
See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation
Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001). In such communities, there may
be an additional incentive to build reputation, but, as noted, the empirical evidence suggests that even
in a looser social environment, many people are willing to bear a personal cost in order to punish
transgression or to make a point.
81. See generally LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, THE PHILOSOPHY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT: MORAL
STAGES AND THE IDEA OF JUSTICE (1981); Lawrence Kohlberg, The Development of Children’s
Orientations Toward a Moral Order: Sequence in the Development of Moral Thought, 51 HUM. DEV. 8
(2008). Each of the three stages mentioned in the text consists of two sub-stages, which I abstract from
here.
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model. At the conventional stage, adults view law abidingness as necessary for
preserving social order. At the post-conventional stage, individuals may give
priority to personal moral considerations over law abidingness. Research by
Tom Tyler and his colleagues empirically examines the question of why people
obey the law and answers, in brief, that they do so when the procedure is fair.82
In his original pioneering study, Tyler has shown that people who were indicted
in a local traffic court in Chicago were more likely to comply with injunctions
against them when they perceived the legal procedure as fair. This was
especially the case when people were given an opportunity to participate in the
process, when the process was neutral, and when they were treated with respect.
Tyler’s procedural justice theory thus focuses on the link between law
abidingness and aspects of identity and the extent to which an individual may
view legal compliance as a conduct that stems from oneself rather than one that
is forced upon one through deterrence.
The values theory, as a general theory of motivational goals, may provide
additional directions toward a better understanding of legal compliance. The
key point, again, is that legal compliance would be perceived by the individual
as desirable, right, and legitimate. Of particular interest is the issue of obeying
the law as such “because it’s the law.” Greater compliance when the conceptual
content of the law is consistent with the values that the individual holds dear
may be analyzed in the framework presented in the preceding section on values
and the content of laws. Compliance in that case will reflect a positive response
to incentives according to the proposed definition of expanded rationality. This
is compliance “because it is worthwhile.” Explaining compliance with the law as
such when the individual is indifferent to the content of the law is more
challenging because one would need to point out a motivation that is strong
enough to overcome the cost of legal compliance in the absence of deterrence.
Hence, the hypothesis would be that individuals will be more likely to support
obeying the law—by themselves or by others—if legal compliance is per se
consistent with their value preferences.
Which value preferences may support law abidingness? The answer depends
on the role the law plays in the eyes of the individual, and it appears that this
answer may vary depending on her value preferences. Individuals whose
worldview emphasizes elements of protection, stability, and anxiety will tend to
see the law as a framework that creates a social foundation, provides certainty,
protects against threats, and is anchored in past traditions and received wisdom.
One may expect, generally, that such people will view obeying the law as the
very essence of this conduct—compliance for the sake of compliance—and will
consider it as right and desirable. In contrast, individuals whose worldview
emphasizes change, self-development, and lack of anxiety may find value in the
law mainly as an instrument—either for protecting personal interests (such as

82. TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (2d ed. 2006).

LICHT

198

2/2/2011

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 74:175

property, reputation, or privacy) or for promoting moral ideas (such as
equality).
The main dimension over which we would expect to observe variability in
the link between law abidingness and values thus will be conservation versus
openness-to-change. Law abidingness correlates most strongly with higher
conformity and security, as well as tradition, because law often has historical
roots. On the self-enhancement versus self-transcendence dimension, opposite
factors may actually affect compliance. A preference for self-enhancement
values is consistent with law abidingness only insofar as it may serve the
individual’s interests—something that the law may do, as noted above.
However, individuals with a strong preference for power values might also view
the law as a constraint and obstruction to personal aggrandizement. Selftranscendence values emphasize the legitimacy of law and of legal compliance
due to their egalitarian quality. At the same time, however, such values may
support a critical attitude toward the law inasmuch as it provides a formal
approval to a morally reprehensible conduct or hinders following a moral
injunction that one personally holds dear. People located on both poles of this
dimension thus may obey the law grudgingly or conditionally—possibly under
the shadow of deterrence—more than from internal motivation.
This brief analysis is consistent with Kohlberg’s approach and with Tyler’s
findings. It should be noted that in Kohlberg’s theory, law abidingness is not
always desirable. Obeying the law as such characterizes the conventional middle
stage. Compliance as a convention, in order to be in line with the general social
order, reflects values of conformity and tradition. In contrast, the higher, postconventional stage legitimizes breaking the law for ethical, extra-legal reasons
that each individual is supposed to assess independently.83
Tyler’s findings, too, are in line with the present argument. The measures
found to contribute to legal compliance trigger universalism values—by
enhancing equality in the process, and self-direction values—by providing
individuals an opportunity to express themselves. These measures may affect
the set of marginal, or swinging, individuals. People who are high in conformity
and in conservation values more generally will tend to obey the law due to their
consistent internal motivations. They do not need any procedural
encouragement. People who are especially high on power values may see their
personal welfare as the supreme interest. In extreme cases, no amount of voice
or fair process would change this motivation (deterrence, too, has limits).
People high on universalism or self-direction, however, may be influenced if the
content meaning of the process is consistent with these values. Elements of
participation, neutrality, and respect thus may reflect the equality facet of
universalism. Providing an opportunity for substantive voice may cause a

83. Kohlberg’s examples mostly refer to helping others—for example, stealing a medicine for a sick
child—and thus reflect benevolence and universalism values that might justify breaking the law “in the
right circumstances.”
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person to view the process as something she could direct, at least in part, and
thus enhance its legitimization and compliance by the individual and by others.84
A study by Ella Daniel and Ariel Knafo reports findings in line with the
present theory.85 These authors investigated value preferences and attitudes
toward law abidingness in samples of Israeli students and youths, including
immigrants.86 The study’s central hypothesis, that law abidingness will correlate
positively with conformity values, received strong support in all the participant
groups. In addition, participants exhibited a negative correlation between law
abidingness on the one hand and universalism and self-direction values on the
other. Interestingly, the authors also report a weak but significant negative
correlation between power and achievement values and attitudes in support of
law abidingness. This finding is in line with the above hypothesis, that
individuals who give special emphasis to self-enhancement may perceive the
law as an unwelcome obstacle to pursuing their self-interest.
C. Value Diversity in Groups
The analysis in the preceding section on different attitudes toward legal
compliance is a specific aspect of the broader issue concerning legal design in an
environment of diversity in value preferences within groups. From the vantage
point of policy and lawmakers, the theory of values-based expanded rationality
points to the need to consider a variety of value preferences in the population.
This point invokes an old bone of contention in the economic literature—
namely, whether, for economic analysis purposes, one may assume that
preferences are uniform. George Stigler and Gary Becker, who are among the
prominent proponents of the standard model of rationality, famously argued
that an economic analysis may concentrate only on differences in prices or
income in order to explain differences or changes in behavior, based on the
assumption that individuals’ preferences are uniform: “[T]astes neither change
capriciously nor differ importantly between people. On this interpretation one
does not argue over tastes for the same reason that one does not argue over the
Rocky Mountains—both are there, will be there next year, too, and are the
same to all men.”87

84. This analysis resembles Robert Cooter’s analysis of creating beneficial social norms by
influencing the marginal members in the population. Cf. Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good
Citizens? An Economic Analysis of Internalized Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1577 (2000); Robert D. Cooter,
Models of Morality in Law and Economics: Self-Control and Self-Improvement for the Bad Man of
Holmes, 78 B.U. L. REV. 903 (1998); Robert D. Cooter, Three Effects of Social Norms on Law:
Expression, Deterrence, and Internalization, 79 OR. L. REV. 1 (2000).
85. Ella Daniel and Ariel Knafo, Values and Attitudes Toward Law Abidingness, ISRAEL J.L. &
BUS. (forthcoming 2010) (in Hebrew).
86. This study did not investigate actual behavior.
87. George J. Stigler & Gary S. Becker, De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum, 67 AM. ECON. REV.
76, 76 (1977).
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Doubtless, the assumption that preferences are uniform is a convenient one
for policymakers and not only for economic modelers. Adopting this
assumption allows the policymaker to propose measures such that the marginal
individual in the population will respond only to changes in prices, income, or
wealth. As the economic research on non-standard preferences developed,
however, it became necessary also to address the distribution of these
preferences in the population. Fehr and Schmidt thus analyze the distribution of
other-regarding preferences in light of empirical data on this subject.88 As we
expand the set of arguments in the personal utility function, and the notion of
rationality more generally, economists and policymakers influenced by
economic analysis will have to take this aspect into consideration. In this
context, too, the values-based model provides a framework for theoretical
analysis and empirical testing.
Suppose that in order to increase the likelihood that a certain law will enjoy
voluntary compliance, lawmakers (be they legislators or judges) would like to
design the law such that it fits the taste of the majority of people. In other
words, the content meaning of the law should be in line with the value
preferences of the majority of the population or at least with that of the median
member. Such a law will be viewed by the populace as legitimate, right, and
desirable. Consequently, there will be less need to rely on people’s willingness
to obey the law as such, or on deterrence, in order to ensure compliance. One
may further assume that politicians are skilled in identifying the public’s value
preferences and in addressing the public in value terms in order to trigger the
responses they want—from electing them to office89 to supporting a particular
legislation.90
Diversity of value preferences within the population, however, may cause
difficulties in legal design. This may be the case when there is a difference
between the value preference distribution among the general public and the

88. Fehr & Schmidt, supra note 31, at 833–44. For a formal model that incorporates diversity in
prosocial tendencies (altruism), see Bénabou & Tirole, supra note 78. On preference distribution and
personality traits, see Bryan Caplan, Stigler–Becker versus Myers–Briggs: Why Preference-Based
Explanations Are Scientifically Meaningful and Empirically Important, 50 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 391
(2003).
89. Consider the closing remarks in the first Bush–Kerry presidential debate:
BUSH: But I just know how this world works, and that in the councils of government, there
must be certainty from the U.S. president. Of course, we change tactics when need to, but we
never change our beliefs, the strategic beliefs that are necessary to protect this country in the
world . . . .
KERRY: But let me talk about something that the president just sort of finished up with.
Maybe someone would call it a character trait, maybe somebody wouldn’t. But this issue of
certainty. It’s one thing to be certain, but you can be certain and be wrong.
Presidential Debate Transcript (Sept. 30, 2004), available at http://www.debates.org/index.php?page=
september-30-2004-debate-transcript. As an exercise, the reader is invited to identify which values are
expressed in each of the candidates’ statements.
90. For a survey, see Stanley Feldman, Values, Ideology, and the Structure of Political Attitudes, in
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY 477 (David O. Sears ed., 2003).
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distribution among a sub-group of the population toward which the law is
directed and that is expected to comply. In this situation, lawmakers may face a
tension between the need to achieve legitimization—perhaps even authority—
from the general public and the desire to design an effective law—one that
triggers values that are endorsed by the group to which this law is directed.
To see this point, consider a fundamental subject in corporate law—the
objectives of the corporation. Corporate fiduciaries must act, in unbending
loyalty and due care, in the best interest of the corporation. Since the
corporation is a purely legal construct, this doctrine hinges on the question of to
which real parties corporations ultimately owe their fiduciary duties. In the
United States and in most other common law jurisdictions, the answer
traditionally has been the shareholders.91 Nevertheless, a debate has been raging
for decades between this view, known as either the shareholder wealth
maximization norm or the shareholder primacy norm, and an opposite view—
known as the stakeholder approach—which calls on corporate fiduciaries to
also take into account the interests of multiple other constituencies, including
employees, creditors, customers, the community, and more.92
Analyzing the basic positions in this debate in light of the values theory
indicates that each position is consistent with a different profile of value.93 On
the self-enhancement versus self-transcendence dimension, the shareholderprimacy approach is consistent with values of power and achievement, while the
multiple-stakeholder approach is consistent with emphasizing universalism. On
the conservation versus openness-to-change dimension, there may be opposite
factors at play. On the one hand, giving primacy to a single constituency—the
shareholders—sets a clear, bright-line rule and is thus consistent with aversion
to ambiguity and complexity, which is linked to security values. A multiplestakeholder rule suggests a mirror image: complexity and uncertainty, which are
consistent with self-direction and stimulation. On the other hand, giving
primacy to shareholders reflects a preference for entrepreneurship and
expresses the nature of the business corporation as a vehicle for venturing. It is
therefore linked conceptually to self-direction and openness-to-change more
generally. As noted above, board members and chief executive officers (CEOs)
of business corporations exhibit a positive correlation between a general proshareholder stance and entrepreneurial values—power, achievement, and selfdirection—and a negative link to universalism. Moreover, board members and

91. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939). In the United Kingdom, see Companies Act,
2006, § 172 (U.K.). But see in Canada, BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 560 (Can.).
92. For reviews, see D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277 (1998);
Licht, supra note 59.
93. This is only a schematic description. For a detailed analysis, see Adams, Licht & Sagiv, supra
note 12.
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CEOs emphasize these entrepreneurial values more strongly than a
representative sample of the population.94
The foregoing discussion may shed light on the design of the legal regime on
this subject. While the general doctrine in the United States gives clear priority
to shareholders,95 some state legislatures recognize the concurrent legitimacy of
other constituencies, and some courts have entertained this idea as well. In
Canada, the Supreme Court has endorsed a multiple-stakeholder approach
more broadly.96 Calls on corporations to exhibit greater “corporate social
responsibility”—one of the versions of a multiple-stakeholder approach—are
often heard from politicians and other social activists. Furthermore, many
subscribe to the view that such an approach is a sound business strategy, which,
in the long run, will also benefit shareholders.97
Thus, while there exist two possible legal strategies for regulating this
corporate fiduciary duty, at least in common law jurisdictions, the shareholderprimacy doctrine is given clear priority. But why? First, the link between each
legal strategy and a particular profile of value preferences suggests that, for
each strategy, there exists a group of individuals in the population that views
this strategy as right and desirable because of the values that these individuals
in general hold as guiding principles in their life.98 This is the reason why the
shareholder–stakeholder debate will never be settled—because it cannot be,
since people may always differ on their primary goals in life.99
Second, continuing this debate ad infinitum is a luxury that residents of the
ivory tower may afford. Lawmakers must reach a resolution and provide
guidance about the prevailing doctrine. Endorsing the shareholder-primacy
norm has two advantages in this regard. First, this doctrine stipulates a clear
rule, which is (relatively) easy to implement and is (relatively) easy to verify in
court. Second, the shareholder-primacy norm is consistent with the value profile
more commonly found among managers than in the general population.
Consequently, it may be easier to apply this norm to all managers even if as a
second best. As the law must impose a uniform regime—that is, one for all
managers (and all judges)—a legal strategy of the second best is not only

94. Id.
95. AM.

LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01 (1994).
96. BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 560 (Can.).
97. The seminal work is R. Edward Freeman, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER
APPROACH (1984). For an empirical meta-analysis, see Joshua D. Margolis, Hillary Anger Elfenbein &
James P. Walsh, Does it Pay to be Good? A Meta-Analysis and Redirection of Research on the
Relationship Between Corporate Social and Financial Performance (Working Paper, 2007), available at
http://stakeholder.bu.edu/2007/Docs/Walsh,%20Jim%20Does%20It%20Pay%20to%20Be%20Good
.pdf.
98. See Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, Individual and Corporate Social Responsibility, 77
ECONOMICA 1 (2010).
99. Licht, supra note 59.
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reasonable, but practically inevitable. There is reason to believe that Adolf
Berle—the pioneering scholarly proponent of the shareholder-primacy norm—
had realized this much nearly eighty years ago. Personally, Berle thought that
business corporations should be managed for the benefit of all social
constituencies. But as a practical legal matter, Berle realized that the multiplestakeholder approach cannot be implemented as a legal doctrine with sufficient
clarity, leading him to support shareholder primacy as a second best option in
an imperfect world.100
D. Values Conflict and the Application of Law
Finally, this section addresses the link between values conflict and the law.
While this issue may be less directly related to the discussion of rationality, it
touches upon a fundamental legal problem—in particular, one that arises in
constitutional jurisprudence. The following discussion, therefore, cannot be
considered as more than just scratching the surface of the subject and is
intended mostly to reveal its link to the general analytical framework presented
here. A fuller treatment must await another opportunity.
A long-standing debate in constitutional jurisprudence deals with the proper
role of values. While some scholars deliberately avoid providing a positive
definition of public values,101 Owen Fiss holds that “[t]he task of the judge is to
give meaning to constitutional values. . . . He searches for what is true, right, or
just.”102 Concurring with William Eskridge that “[p]ublic values have a
gravitational force,”103 Aharon Barak nonetheless conjectures that “[l]egal
science has not yet developed a satisfactory ‘theory of values,’ and it is
questionable whether such a theory could ever be developed.”104
Even if legal science may not have yet developed a satisfactory theory of
values, it seems that psychological science has made considerable inroads
toward dispelling the doubt as to whether such a theory could ever be

100. See, e.g., A.A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L.
REV. 1365, 1365–67 (1932) (“Now I submit that you can not abandon emphasis on ‘the view that
business corporations exist for the sole purpose of making profits for their stockholders’ until such time
as you are prepared to offer a clear and reasonably enforceable scheme of responsibilities to someone
else.”). Tellingly, the issue is discussed in the fifth chapter of A.A. BERLE, JR., THE 20TH CENTURY
CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 164 (1954), which is entitled “Corporate Capitalism and ‘The City of God.’”
For a detailed analysis, see Licht, supra note 59.
101. See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1694
(1984) (arguing that a public value can be defined as any justification for government action that goes
beyond the exercise of raw political power). Mark Tushnet noted that “the appeal [to public values]
rarely gives content to the public values it invokes.” Mark V. Tushnet, Anti-Formalism in Recent
Constitutional Theory, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1502, 1540 (1985).
102. Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 9 (1979).
103. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007,
1018 (1989).
104. Aharon Barak, A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV.
L. REV. 19, 90 (2002).
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developed. In fact, former Justice Souter recently put forward a crisp account of
values’ role in constitutional law, which sounds remarkably close to the
psychological theory of values:
The explicit terms of the Constitution, in other words, can create a conflict of
approved values, and the explicit terms of the Constitution do not resolve that conflict
when it arises . . . . A choice may have to be made, not because language is vague but
because the Constitution embodies the desire of the American people, like most
people, to have things both ways. We want order and security, and we want liberty.
And we want not only liberty but equality as well. These paired desires of ours can
clash, and when they do a court is forced to choose between them, between one
105
constitutional good and another one.

Souter echoes Fiss’s understanding of values as ideas about what is true,
right, and just—a direct parallel to the definition of values as conceptions of the
desirable. By observing that people desire “to have things both ways,” Souter
points to the fact that nearly all values are desirable and that they come in pairs
of inherently conflicting goals, thus capturing the interrelations between values
that the psychological theory postulates. Souter thus echoes Isaiah Berlin’s
famous observation, that “[t]he need to choose, to sacrifice some ultimate
values to others, turns out to be a permanent characteristic of the human
predicament.”106 Souter further identifies prominent values that represent both
of the dimensions in the Schwartz model: security versus liberty on conservation
versus openness-to-change, and equality (in universalism) on self-enhancement
versus self-transcendence.107 Finally, in a rather piercing remark, Souter
identifies the link between ambiguity aversion and the preference for security:
I have to believe that something deeper is involved, and that behind most dreams of a
simpler Constitution there lies a basic human hunger for the certainty and control that
the fair reading model seems to promise. And who has not felt that same hunger? Is
there any one of us who has not lived through moments, or years, of longing for a
world without ambiguity, and for the stability of something unchangeable in human
108
institutions?

Not all lawyers may subscribe to the general vision reflected in these
passages. In fact, the mainstream approach in U.S. constitutional law endorses
using categorical classifications as a means for deciding between conflicting
rights or interests. Stated in general terms, a categorical approach seeks to hold
that particular cases are governed by a particular category—say, a certain
constitutional right—such that, by implication, competing categories

105. Justice David H. Souter, Remarks at Harvard Commencement (May 27, 2010), available at
http://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2010/05/text-of-justice-david-souters-speech/.
106. ISAIAH BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY, Ii (1969) (also stating that “The simple point
which I am concerned to make is that where ultimate values are irreconcilable, clear-cut solutions
cannot, in principle, be found. To decide rationally in such situations is to decide in the light of general
ideals, the over-all pattern of life pursued by a man or a group or a society.” Id. at I.).
107. Notwithstanding his skepticism about legal science, Barak’s writing and judicial decisions as the
President of the Israeli Supreme Court reflect similar views. See generally Aharon Barak, Proportional
Effect: The Israeli Experience, 57 U. TORONTO L.J. 369 (2007); Barak, supra note 104.
108. Souter, supra note 105.
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(competing rights or interests) do not apply. Free speech and public security are
the standard examples.
This debate is particularly prominent in constitutional law because
constitutional rights are typically “big”—free speech, privacy, property—so
that, together with their political origins, these rights have exceptional
normative power. Yet, the debate about rights conflict is more fundamental. In
the philosophical discourse on the nature of rights in general, two positions
have emerged that resemble the constitutional discourse.109 Some argue that a
right must have well-defined boundaries within which it is absolute—that is, no
other right can contradict or overcome it. It thus follows that the proper
response to an alleged conflict between rights is to better delineate their realms
such that they will integrate rather than overlap.110 Others maintain, however,
that such a definition of rights is unrealistic and that there can always be some
overlap—and hence, conflict—between rights.111
In the present context, we do not have to take a stand in this debate
because, among other things, rights are a more rigid concept than values. Rights
are based on values.112 What these separate discourses share, however, is the
need to address the interrelations between conceptions of the desirable in
different discussions about the desirable—in psychology, law, or philosophy.
Research in psychology cannot refute, or even limit, the development of
notional constructs in law or philosophy. Pure analytical theories are not bound
by reality and do not need to be validated empirically. A theory of values that
has been validated empirically nonetheless may contribute to assessing such
notional constructs or suggest directions for further development. For example,
the universal values identified at the individual level may help develop a
universal theory of rights. The insight that individuals can analyze cognitive
representations of the desirable and find different balancing points between
them in different circumstances could help in assessing means for resolving

109. The following text draws on Jonathan Crowe, Explaining Natural Rights: Ontological Freedom
and the Foundations of Political Discourse, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 70 (2009); Leif Wenar, Rights,
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Sept. 8, 2010), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/
entries/rights/.
110. See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980); HILLEL STEINER, AN
ESSAY ON RIGHTS (1994); GRÉGOIRE C. N. WEBBER, THE NEGOTIABLE CONSTITUTION: ON THE
LIMITATION OF RIGHTS ch. 4 (2009); Russ Shafer-Landau, Specifying Absolute Rights, 37 ARIZ. L.
REV. 209 (1995). Hence the term “specificationism” by Shafer-Landau and the adjective “compossible”
for rights by Steiner.
111. See Joel Feinberg, Voluntary Euthanasia and the Inalienable Right to Life, in RIGHTS, JUSTICE,
AND THE BOUNDS OF LIBERTY 221, 225 (1980); A. JOHN SIMMONS, MORAL PRINCIPLES AND
POLITICAL OBLIGATIONS 24–28 (1979); JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, THE REALM OF RIGHTS (1990).
112. See Alon Harel, Theories of Rights, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW
AND LEGAL THEORY 191, 202–03 (Martin P. Golding & William A. Edmundson eds., 2005) (“It is only
the full awareness of the meaningfulness of these practices [recognizing rights] which facilitate access to
these values, and such an awareness is nourished by the judicial reiteration of the role the values have
in justifying the right and dictating its scope.”).
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conflicts between rights—for example, a proportionality test or other
approaches.
V
CONCLUSION
This article has surveyed central developments in the theory of values in
psychology and in economic research on rationality. An attempt was made to
show that there exists substantial commonality among these disciplines in
regard to conceptions of the desirable, which may facilitate the development of
an expanded theory of rationality. Finally, this article has demonstrated how
this analytical framework may be utilized to shed new light on basic legal issues.
Needless to say, these are only first steps, which one hopes others will find
worthy of consideration.

